The philosophical arguments for and against creation ex nihilo are often very complex and confusing. They range from logical arguments that seem supported from a realists perspective to metaphysical arguments that seem to support and anti-realists perspective. Many of these arguments seem to cross over between these viewpoints making the arguments difficult to categorize in either camp. The ground that seems to be most hotly debated is whether or not an infinite regress is an actual infinity. The essence of the argument that an infinite regress does not represent an actual infinity can be formulated accordingly.

A. An actual infinity cannot exist.
B. An actual infinite regress of events is an actual infinite.
C. Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.

The debate over whether or not A is correct rests upon the word “exist”. William Lane Craig argues that, “it is important to understand that by ‘exist’ we mean ‘exist in reality’” . This is extremely important because many philosophers believe that it is not important whether or not this exists in reality or metaphysically. As David Hume writes that it is possible that the universe sprang into existence wholly uncaused because we can imagine it happening. He summed up this strange Anselm-like ontological argument by stating,
“…as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, ‘twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. The beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction or absurdity; and is therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning from mere ideas; without which ‘tis impossible to demonstrate the necessity of a cause.” Basically, if we can conceive of it happening metaphysically in our mind, then it can happen.

Interestingly, Wes Morriston borrows from Hume’s point of view arguing that “infinity is always there”; therefore invalidating premise A. This is an attempt to counter Craig’s assertion that actual infinity is impossible because formation by successive addition entails formation from a starting point. Therefore, if there is a starting pint, then there can be no actual infinite invalidating his hypothesis that “infinity is always there.” A strong proof that Morriston asserts in his attempt to refute premise A is to follow Hume’s reasoning. Morriston states that, “Why isn’t it enough to just say, ‘That’s how we imagined the case’?”

William Lane Craig counters that Hume’s argument is improbable. He points to Anscombe who states, “The trouble about it (Hume’s argument) is that it is very unconvincing.” He also points out that F. C. Copleston states, “…even if one can imagine first a blank, as it were, and then X existing, it by no means follows necessarily that X can really begin to exist without an extrinsic cause.”

In addition to this line of reasoning being applicable to Morriston, David S. Oderberg questions Morriston’s arguments against successive addition. Morriston accused Craig and others of using premise A as question beggin. He states, “It is utterly question begging that every series of events must have formed starting with a first event.” David Oderberg disagrees and counters that Morriston’s line of reasoning violates the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Oderberg succinctly states that this principal demands that every event have an adequate explanation. Oderberg believes that Morriston’s objections to Craig’s arguments are wholly insufficient. Oderberg states that Morriston’s viewpoint of time, asserted by Morriston as a lynchpin for his argument against premise A, is also insufficient. Oderberg writes, “If the issue of substantivalism versus relationalism about time had any relevance to the intelligibility of the (Morriston’s) question, wouldn’t the relationalist be entitled to say that the question was empty or trivial, since there was no independent metric against which the counting events could be measured.”

Premise B has been attacked aggressively by opponents of this argument as well. Craig and others put forward the famous example of Hilbert’s Hotel as a proof that an infinite regression of events cannot constitute an actual infinity. Opponents do not believe that Hilbert’s Hotel is a warranted refutation of an infinite regress constituting an actual infinity.

Hilbert’s Hotel is an illustration, created by David Hilbert, which attempts to show that you cannot add to an actual infinity. It also attempts to show that you can add to a potential infinity. William L. Craig uses this illustration to help prove that what many people consider as actual infinities are really potential infinities; therefore helping to support premise B.

Hilbert’s Hotel shows that if you have an actual infinity, all of the potential rooms in the hotel must be occupied. Since all of the rooms are occupied, there is no way guests can check into the hotel. There is no vacancy in the hotel, so the manager cannot sell more rooms.

In order for the proprietor to sell more rooms, he would have to have a potentially infinite number of rooms, not an actually infinite number of rooms. In a potential infinity, you can always add guests to the room because you are constantly able to create or add new rooms. There is always a vacancy in the hotel because if a new person wants to check into the hotel, then a new room is added.

Craig uses this example as a way of attempting to refute those who argue that a potential infinity is an actual infinity. If a new room is added, then the hotel was not actually infinite because you cannot add to infinity. As Craig states, “The proprietor’s actions can only work (selling additional rooms) if the hotel is a potential infinite, such that new rooms are created to absorb the influx of guests.” You can add to a potential infinity which is analogous to a temporal regress of events. This argument is used when attackers of premise B argue that a temporal regress of events can represent an actual infinity.

As Wes Morriston states, the absurdity of Hilbert’s Hotel makes sense and many philosophers would “agree with Craig that such a thing could not exist in any world.” But Morriston disagrees that a series of past events cannot be actually infinite, so he attempts to dismiss the relevance of Hilbert’s Hotel to the argument against a temporal regress constituting an actual infinity. He argues that the reason the “Absurd Implication” flows from Hilbert’s Hotel to an actual infinity does not follow because, “the way in which infinity interacts with other features of the example,” are not necessarily fair. As an example, he states, “If the rooms and guests did not exist simultaneously, the idea of the hotel being ‘full’ would lose all meaning.”

Morriston concedes that he is arguing from a metaphysical and anti-realistic presupposition. “I think, that no set of real objects could be actually infinite, but at most that there cannot be an actual infinite set of a certain sort – one whose elements are co-existing objects bearing a changeable physical relationship to one another. It is only when these features are taken together…that we get the Absurd Implication.”

Morriston continues on to attack the dynamic or “A” theory of time, where past and future events change position in relationship to the present. Morriston attacks the position because it seems to support the Hilbert analogy with respect to the impossibility of an infinite regress constituting an actual infinity. Perhaps as events get “added” to the past, they do not have to get shifted? He asks, “Why suppose that the past already contains all past times? Why not simply say that new temporal locations are continually added to the past to accommodate new events as they become past?”

Oderberg strongly disagrees with Morriston’s assertions that his attacks render Hilbert’s Hotel a poor analogy. Oderberg states, “The position of the event in the series cannot be shifted; but its temporal location relative to the present not only can be shifted but is continually being shifted as events recede further into the past.” Oderberg further goes on to buttress the assertion that a potential infinite or infinite temporal regress is not an actual infinity. “But suppose the past were actually infinite; then there would be past events which were actually infinitely distant from the present. So every temporal location in the past would be occupied by an event, up to infinity. Then suppose a new event occurs-where does it go.” Oderberg does not feel that Morriston has answered the question and sums up by stating, “Hence, Prof. Morriston’s dismissal of Craig’s use of Hilbert’s Hotel is too swift.”

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