National Child Support Enforcement Association Uses Enron-Style Accounting in Scramble to Protect Federal Funds

Collections are not up – the amount tracked it up. The support amount increased because the government now orders fathers pay the State directly, where before fathers paid mom directly.

For example, for many years husband pays his ex-wife monthly $1,000 directly. But, for the past 3-4 years, when ex-wife calls father a deadbeat in Family Court [Petition for Contempt of Court], the father is ordered by the Court to pay begin paying the monthly $1,000 State directly.

The State adds a new account to the accounting system, which increases the dollar amount that goes through the system.

Technically, collections are not up – the numbers of fathers tracked in the Support’s accounting system are up.

Note: no Clerks in the Kane County Circuit Court’s Support and Collections department has a CPA or experience in public accounting.

Well,it should not surprize you. If people who are running a criminal enterprize,ie the child support system, act like criminals. You see , amoung real criminals,ie the ones society recognizes as criminals, understand that what they are doing in wrong. Now the thieves and terrorist who run the child support system, they don’t realize that what they are doing is wrong. That by commonlaw,stealing is stealing, no matter how pretty and polictically correct you try and paint it.
So, they don’t even atemp to cover up their criminal behavior.
I just wonder what these people are going to do when the forces of righteousness come for them, will they deny their guilt, will they deny they even commited a crime or will they cry and scream when they are punished. Lacking the guts to say “yea we did it and now we will man enough to take the just punishment for it. Naw I …doubt it , they like all thieve, criminals,and terrorist,are cowards and when it comes time to answer for what they have done, they will try and make run for it. They will cry like little babies when some of these bastards are executed for their crimes.

One of the public policy reasons for prohibiting extortion and peonage is that those being extorted sometimes react badly.

The National Child Support Enforcement Association is well advised to spend liberally on security!

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ex. rel.,

Maddalena Ferrara
Petitioner,
v.

Thurston Paul Bell,
Respondent,
))))))))

Docket No. 105397

IV-D No. 001272538

NOTICE OF SPECIAL APPEARANCE

Comes now Mr. Thurston Paul Bell, appearing Specially and in his proper person, making this Special Appearance specifically challenging the assumed jurisdiction of this Court over him.
I. FACTS
The facts of this matter reveal that:
A. this Court and the State of Tennessee ( the State) has never obtained in personum jurisdiction over Mr. Bell while he lived in Knox County, has been informed of the failure of the State to apply proper and established due process requirements of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UISFA).
B. On December 11, 2006 Mr. Bell filed and made service upon the listed authorities in Exhibit A, a Constructive Notice of Demand for Verification of Authority to enforce an out of state child support order over him. Pages 3-5 of this document reveal specifics of Mr. Bell’s Challenge of Authority and claims of Lack of Jurisdiction and denial of due process of law. The main focus was the lack of Notice of the process within the UISFA at Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, and thus denying MR. Bell due process of law, where Mr. Bell cited the following Tennessee Case in support:
“Where chancery court enforced part of the Kansas court’s …decree…enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s (UIFSA), specially T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A. § 36-5-2607, because the Kansas Court’s decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of registration or opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree.” Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S. W. 3d. 783 (Tenn.2004)

C. In a Letter dated December 27, 2006, and repeated again on April 26, 2007, Assistant General Counsel for the Tennessee Department of Human Services (TN-DHAS), Danielle Whitworth-Barnes, stated that Mr. Bell failed to state a defense pursuant to T.C.A. §36-5-2607. (Exhibit A attached to January 3, 2007 Notice of Default and Demand for Authority [Exhibit B] and Exhibit C. This indicates that the UISFA was supposed to be applied to Mr. Bell, and as he asserts this includes proper Notice and Service per the requirements of the law in Jolly v. Jolly (supra).
D. On January 3, 2007, Mr. Bell filed and mailed to make service upon the listed authorities on Exhibit B, a Constructive Notice of Default of the facts contained in Exhibit A which are now stipulated facts which include the fact that the State of Tennessee DHS failed to register the Foreign State Order is seeks to enforce as required by the procedures of the UISFA T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607 and Jolly (supra).
E. Mr. Bell moved out of Knox County on or about March 1, 2007; (Exhibits D and E)
F. Mr. Bell is no longer within the physically restricted jurisdiction of this Court which never applied the proper and established due process requirements of the UISFA to establish in personum jurisdiction over him;
G. Since moving out of Knox County, the State of Tennessee Department of Human Services, Child Support Services (DHS-CSS) has been in possession of knowledge from Mr. Bell (Exhibits G-I) that not only has he moved out of Knox County, but that he still objects to the State’s failure and refusal to apply the proper and established due process requirements of the UISFA to establish impersonum jurisdiction over him and the matter it has presently assumed outside of the UISFA;
H. On Tuesday June 26, 2007, at about 9:43 AM Mr. Bell received a telephone call from Lieutenant Grimes of the Knox County Sheriff’s Office (Lt. Grimes) calling from 865-556-7021 where the Leutenent arranged to make service of papers to Mr. Bell in the Middle of the Street, Manor Way, in Blount County, at about 10:00 AM.
I. Manor Way in Blount County is not inside of Knox County and is therefore outside of the jurisdiction of the Sheriff of Knox County.
J. On Tuesday June 26, 2007, at about 10:00 AM Lt. Grimes gave Mr. Bell the subject papers (Partially Evidenced as Exhibits J-M) and told Mr. Bell that the Knox County had jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant for him if he failed to appear in Knox County on August 16, 2007 as directed by the Papers.
K. The papers served as evidenced by Exhibits J-M reveal that despite Mr. Bell’s prior demand for evidence of the documents served upon him pursuant to the UISFA T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607 and Jolly (supra) in Exhibit’s a and B, there was no evidence within the record provided, that Mr. Bell had ever been served with such required notice, the file is therefore incomplete, and the facts thus stipulated by silence on January 3, 2007 are beyond any doubt true, meaning the State has never properly acquired jurisdiction in this matter.
L. Lt. Grimes repeated the warning with a tone of pity communicating his desire to not have to come see Mr. Bell to bring him in.
M. Mr. Bell believing that Lt. Grimes had every intention of following any orders he is given, intimated to Lt. Grimes that he was outside of and beyond his jurisdiction and was surprised at the threat and assertion.
N. Mr. Bell asked Lt. Grimes to note, as an officer of the Court, that Mr. Bell will be filing a Habeas Corpus in this matter.

II. ISSUES
A. Limitations of Physical Jurisdiction of this Court.
1. Mr. Bell is presently located outside of the physical limitations of the jurisdiction of this Court as shown by Exhibit D – Lease on his Apartment, and Exhibit E – his the Registration of his Leased Car .
2. This Circuit Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the County of Knox, and does not appear to carry an overlap with the County of Blount as “In 1977, the State Legislature created a new judicial district comprised solely of Blount County.” (Exhibit N – definition of the Blount County Circuit Court’s jurisdiction from the Office of District Attorney General for Blount County at http://www.blounttn.org/da.asp)
3. Within the papers provided by Lt. Grimes is a claim on the second page (Exhibit K) regarding the threat of a seizure of property, which can only occur within the County and location of Mr. Bell, which is now Blount County, thus excludes the authority of the Knox Sheriff’s Office.

B. State was previously notified of its failure to provide established due process of law and thus failure to secure jurisdiction.
1. Mr. Bell’s Exhibits A, B, and F-I reveal his consistent good faith and due diligence pressing for proper notification of due process from the State where he could make proper argument, as was supposed to be his Right under law (UISFA) at T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, and that until then and then completion of the Process the State had no jurisdiction over him per the determinations of the Courts in Jolly v. Jolly (supra).
2. In Mr. Bell’s Exhibits A, B, and F-I, he directly confronted TN DHS-CSS, and this Court, with the fact that no due process had been provided to him for them to have any jurisdiction or right to make any claims or assumption of jurisdiction over him, and to cease and desist.
3. Exhibit B’s attached Exhibit A is a letter of December 27, 2006, from the Assistant General Counsel of TN DHS, Danielle Whitworth- Barnes, stating that the State has jurisdiction over Mr. Bell because A.) he is in the State, and B.) he did not make any legal arguments pursuant to T.C.A §36-5-2607.
4. Exhibits B and F-I as sent to Assistant General Counsel Barnes (Exhibit A apparently read by her to initiate her December 27, 2006 Letter -Exhibit A of Exhibit B) point out that for Mr. Bell to make an argument pursuant to T.C.A §36-5-2607, he first needed to be provided with proper notice of the process under the UISFA per Jolly (supra), which referred specifically to T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, which never happened. Mr. Bell insisted that she prove otherwise.
5. On February 20, March 12, April 17, and May 12, 2007 Mr. Bell wrote letters (Exhibits F-I) where Assistant General Counsel Barnes for TN DHS was repeatedly told that he was A.) Never given NOTICE of UISFA process per Jolly (supra) which referred specifically to T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, to be able to provide an argument per T.C.A. §36-5-2607, and said due process was never initiated for jurisdiction of the State to be obtained;
6. In Exhibit I, Mr. Bell intimated to the State that due process was important to him and he would not yield to State actions outside of the law and that due process was not provided he expected that this matter would be immediately closed.
7. In Exhibit I, Mr. Bell intimated to the State that it appeared that Asst. General Counsel Barnes was not responding to his letters in a meaningful capacity addressing this violation of due process which is quite similar to Jolly (supra) and the requirements that Due Process of Statutory law be followed by the State, and asked:
“Is there another language that I need to be writing in in order to communicate properly with your offices regarding the denial of due process by failure to make notice to me pursuant to the UIFSA so that I might have been offered an opportunity to make a defense?”

C. Evidence of State intention to deny due process of law from the beginning.
1. Mr. Bell’s Exhibit M reveals that the Transmittal letter from the County of Northampton Pennsylvania was dated 10/9/2006.
2. The first bill from the TN-DHS-CSS (Exhibit O) is dated 11/18/06 which Reveals that there was not much time at all for the issuance of the Bill (Exhibit O) from the date of Pennsylvania Transmittal letter, for any due process of law to be provided to Mr. Bell even if he had been properly served with NOTICE of UISFA process per Jolly (supra) which referred specifically to T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, to be able to provide an argument §36-5-2607, as Assistance General Counsel Barnes has stated twice as his Right. (Exhibit C and Exhibit B‘s attached Exhibit A.)
3. The State has never presented a copy of its service of NOTICE of UISFA process per Jolly (supra) ( T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607), pursuant to his DEMAND in Exhibit A.
4. Per Exhibit C and Exhibit B’s attached Exhibit A, the State admitted that the only means by which Mr. Bell could have ever had a defense against the State was to raise one or more from T.C.A. §36-5-2607.
5. In the record provided to Mr. Bell by Lt. Grimes (Exhibits J-M) there was no record of prior service of NOTICE of UISFA process per Jolly (supra) as required by T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, that offered Mr. Bell an opportunity to provide an argument per T.C.A. §36-5-2607.
F. State is illegally assuming jurisdiction and denying substantive due process of law.
1. Despite the facts of the jurisdictional failures pointed out above in section “B” , on the First Page of the papers received from Lt. Grimes (Exhibit J), Jurisdiction is still assumed by the command by Summons for Records of Income from Mr. Bell, as the ALIAS SUMMONS, executed by Martha Phillps and Signed June 15th, 2007, from the Fourth Circuit Court of Knox County Tennessee commands Mr. Bell to bring with him proof of income.
2. The First page (Exhibit J) lacks a signature by the State Attorney, which makes it appear that that section of the Summons does not apply and Mr. Bell is entitled to no defense whatsoever as there was no signature by the attorney for the State indicating that Mr. Bell had 30 days to respond to the Alias Summons.
3. The Second Page of the documents (Exhibit K), in asserting that property can be taken is further evidence that this Court believes that it already possesses jurisdiction and that it has cause to believe that Mr. Bell has not been making some effort to comply with the Foreign Order that was never properly registered per T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607 as required by the statute per the Courts in Jolly (supra).
4.The Third page of the document from the Fourth Circuit Court of Knox County (Exhibit L) is called a NOTICE but does not contain any signature of an officer of the Court.
5. The Third Page (Exhibit L) NOTICE sent by the Fourth Circuit Court appears to be an unexecuted NOTICE from the Fourth Circuit Court of Knox County that for hearing on a Petition for Foreign Judgment.
6. The Third Page (Exhibit L) NOTICE does not contain any notification of the Defenses that Mr. Bell is allowed to make pursuant to the UISFA as set forth by Assistant General Counsel to the TN DHS. Exhibits C and Exhibit B’s attached Exhibit A.
7. In the record provided to Mr. Bell by Lt. Grimes (Exhibits J-M), there was no record of prior service of NOTICE of UISFA process per Jolly (supra) which referred specifically to T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607, that offered Mr. Bell an opportunity to provide an argument per T.C.A. §36-5-2607.
8. The assumption above proves to Mr. Bell that this Court is in no capacity fair, as the Summons already assumes Jurisdiction that has admittedly never been obtained under the UISFA . Thus Mr. Bell has no reason to believe that this Court is not prejudiced or has any intention of providing meaningful due process of law as required by the UISFA.
G. The Facts of denial of due process of law per Mr. Bell’s Exhibits A and B are stipulated.
1. The State was served with Constructive Notice and Demand for Verification of Authority and asked to make presentment of important documents that would reveal how it obtained jurisdiction over Mr. Bell. (Exhibit A)
2. The State was under a duty to respond and did not do as directed to be a meaningful response (Exhibit A of Exhibit B) as it failed to provide the items specifically demanded of it to prove its authority in this matter.
3. State was served Notice of Default and that the facts of Exhibit A were now stipulated. (Exhibit B)
4. The law recognizes that what constituted a legal and binding ‘stipulation’ is quite flexible in its application, and not concrete as some may believe:
“The term “stipulation” ordinarily connotes an agreement entered into by parties in litigation, but this need not be necessarily so. The practice followed in Admiralty, while not strictly in point, is one which indicates the use of unilateral stipulations as a mode of releasing property from custody. Admiralty Rules, Rule 6, 28 U.S.C.A.” Garden Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 142 F. Supp 744, 745 (1956)

5. Stipulation is an admission of facts of the record:
“Stipulation is an admission.” Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir.1991)” Willett v. State of Kansas, 942 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (D. Kan. 1996), affirmed 120 F3d 272

6. Stipulations cannot be disregarded and set aside on a whim as the State is doing by this present action:
“A stipulation constitutes an admission which “cannot be disregarded or set aside as will.” Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1097 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting) Lyles v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 614 F.2d 691,694 (10th Cir. 1980)” Pyles v. Boeing Co., 187 F. Supp.2d 1311, 1316 (D. Kan 2002)

7. Stipulation of facts is achieved by silence under the law and especially in circumstances involving the government which is completely accountable to the People, the Public Record, and the Courts:
“It is a familiar rule of evidence that silence when there is a duty to speak is tantamount to an often creates an estoppel against, or “waiver” of right of later saying otherwise.” Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 424 (D.C.S.D. Ga, 1942) affirmed 131 F.2d 110

“In 67 C.J. … p.306… “A waiver may be implied from the silence of the party who has the power of waiving, under the circumstances which require him to speak. Such silence, it has been said, must be deceptive silence, accompanied by an intention to defraud which amounts to a positive beguilement.” Sammons v. Hodges, 95 S.W.2d 734, 737 (1936)

“Silence can only be equated with fraud where there is a legal or moral duty to speak or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally misleading.” [citing United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021[, 1032] (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831, 91 S. Ct. 62, 27 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1970)] U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d. 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)

H. Denial of Due Process of Law vitiates the Jurisdiction of any Court, and any subsequent orders are Void.
1. The Courts in Tennessee have made it very clear that Jurisdiction does not extend to a Court where there is denial of due process of law, even by failure to serve Notice, and any order issuing under any such circumstance is a void judgment:
“Where chancery court enforced part of the Kansas court’s …decree…enforcement violated the registration and notice provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act’s (UIFSA), specially T.C.A. § 36-5-2601 to T.C.A. § 36-5-2607, because the Kansas Court’s decree was never registered in Tennessee and the husband was never provided notice of registration or opportunity to contest the validity and enforcement of the decree.” Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S. W. 3d. 783 (Tenn.2004)

2. It appears that the Tennessee Courts have determined that Notice is an important part of Due Process of Law just like proper Notice by clear and understandable publication of a statute is the beginning of due process of law:
“(A) statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

3. Lower courts must confine their rulings to First to Fundamental Law which includes Notice and Due Process of law which encompasses applicable statutes and the facts of the record (6th Amendment) and Second to the controlling precedent, otherwise Justice breaks down. Thus, the requirement that lower Courts comport their rulings to established precedent is clear and certain, and departure is in itself denial of due process by governance without established law, and is therefore unconstitutional:
“It is on this account that our law is deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles, and not dependant on the caprice or will of judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.” Anastasoff vs. U.S., 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000)

“Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803). This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821).” Anastasoff, supra at p. 899-900

“It was required, and enforced in every state in the Union; and a departure from it would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all the just checks upon judicial authority. “Anastasoff, supra at p. 904

“…that courts have the following power: to choose for themselves, from among all the cases they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and those that they need not. Indeed, some forms of the non-publication rule even forbid citation. Those courts are saying to the bar: “We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does not bind us today, and, what’s more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday.” As we have tried to explain in this opinion, such a statement exceeds the judicial power, which is based on reason, not fiat.” Anastasoff, supra at p. 904

“Cases can be overruled. Sometimes they should be. … If the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. ..our reasons for rejecting it should be made convincingly clear… “ Anastasoff, supra at pp.904-905

“…judicial power beyond the limits set by Article III by allowing us complete discretion to determine which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not. Insofar as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions… is …unconstitutional.“ Anastasoff, supra at p 905

4. There is much evidence that the Courts all over America understand that Orders and Judgments issued in cases where there is a due process violation are void:
“A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void “ Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-733 (1878).” World-Wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,291 (1980)

“If this requirement of the … Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment … pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void.‘ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024-1023 (1938)

“…a safeguard for due process – a pattern for a fair hearing. It is only when failure to observe this safeguard amounts to denial of due process, that the court is deprived of jurisdiction.” Merritt v. Hunter, 170 F2d 739, 741 (10th Cir. 1948)

“A “void” judgment is one where, e.g., the Court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or entry of order violated due process.” See also Klapptrott, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S. Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (due process), (U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5)
Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell, 110 F.R.D. 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

“Judgment is ‘void’ … where court that entered it lacked jurisdiction, acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law, or entered decree outside of its authority in a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Grun v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 170 F.R.D. 441, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1996)

Under Federal Rule of Civil procedure 60(b)(4), void judgments, I.e., judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside. See Textile banking Co. v. Rentchler, 657 F. 2d 844.850 (7th Cir. 1981) (Rule 60(b) mandates the setting aside of judgments if the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant whom I was entered)” [Triad supra] Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, 158 F.R.D. 278,279 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

5. Denial of Due Process is considered to have occurred when a lower Court refuses to comport its actions to the instructions of the Higher Courts. Such instances are called “usurpation of power” and call for extraordinary remedy:
“…it is clear only exceptional circumstances amounting to “usurpation of power” will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. DeBeers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945). Thus the writ has been invoked where…it was necessary to confine a lower court to the terms of …mandate, United States v. United States Dist. Court, 334 U.S. 258 (1948), and where a district judge displayed a persistent disregard of the Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by this Court, La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); see McCullough v. Cosgrove, 309 U.S. 634 (1940); Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Corp. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 706, 707 (1927)(dictum).
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 95-96, (1967)
6. Such usurpations of power occur when the lower Court does not Comport its actions to the standards of due process of law for the institution of justice for the preservation of our society as directed by the U.S. Supreme Court. This includes proper examination and ruling pursuant to the evidence in the record:
“the role of … a judge…may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions…exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials…”
* * *
“…the same safeguards as are available in the judicial process. The proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitutes the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.”
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U.S 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002)

“It is beyond question, of course, that a conviction based on a record lacking any relevant evidence as to a crucial element . . . violate[s] due process.” Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232, 1233 (1971). (DOUGLAS, J., in chambers); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968); see also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 44 (1966).” Vachon v. New Hampshire, 414 U.S. 478, 480 (1974)

“[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.” Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)

7. In such an instance as demonstrated by the Record presented here, it is the duty of this Court to govern its actions accordingly and not allow a fraud upon Justice to occur:
“No fraud is more odious than an attempt to subvert the administration of justice.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 251 (1944)

“…tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., supra, at p. 246

8. In addition to Jolly (supra), the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee appears to be taking the requirement of due process quite seriously, as can be ascertained from the attached copy of the ruling in Cottingham v. Cottingham, No. M2003-00535-SC-R11-CV. (Exhibit P – taken from http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/Sc2qtr2006.htm and http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/OPINIONS/TSC/PDF/062/CottinghaJopn.pdf)
It is clear that the Tennessee Supreme Court is not allowing mere expediency of administrative functions of government to be used to justify the victimization of Men by incarcerating them for private debts in violation of the Peonage Act, in order to prop up the political and financial aspirations of the Child Support System Bureaucracy that maintains a financial motive an opportunity by its Federal subsidization by matching grant money:
“It has long been established that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise a right guaranteed by the Constitution.”
* * *
“…constitutional deprivations may not be justified by some remote administrative benefit to the State.” Harmen v. Foressenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965)

and that penalty can by no means be denial of due process of law.
It appears that Tennessee is going to lead the way to sanity for this Nation as it has demonstrated its WILL to return Constitutional Rights to Men under the persecution of the Child Support System, and ensure its future by investment in Ordered Justice with consideration of Ancient Rights.
9. The Duty of this Court is Justice under Fundamental Law:
“It is elementary law that every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution.” McCullough v. Virginia., 172.U.S.102, 19 S. Ct. 134 (1898)

I. The Court is obligated to protect and defend the Rights of the Citizen is this matter as a matter of Right.

1. The duty of the Court is first and foremost to the Rights of the People as contained in the Fundamental Law (McCullough (supra)) as it was instituted for the securing of the Rights of the People:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed…”
Declaration of Independence (1776), “The Organic Laws of the United States of America.” (Title 1 United States Code)

for only the Court can peacefully protect the from usurpations of Rights by the Government.
2. The Court must provide equal protection under the law to Mr. Bell as performed in Jolly (supra):
“It, of course, tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required minimum of protection for everyone’s right to life, liberty, and property, which the Congress or the Legislature may not withhold. Our whole system of law is predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. ‘All men are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a government of laws and not of men,’ ‘No man is above the law,’ are all maxims showing the spirit in which Legislatures, Executives, and courts, are expected to make, execute and apply laws.” Truax v. Corrigan, 275 U.S. 312, 332 (1921)

thus the Courts has the duty to read that which a Citizen submits, and read the whole of the law and precedent it seeks to apply prior to making its determinations.
3. The duty of the Court to provide due process of law is reinforced by Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir., June 30 1980) states the following in embracing the Universal Declaration of Rights over the entire United States of America:
“The United Nation Charter (a treaty of the United States, see 59 Stat. 1033 (1945)) makes it clear that in this modern age a state’s treatment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern. It provides:

“With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations … the United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.
Id. Art. 55. And further:
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
Id. Art. 56.

“…there is at present no dissent from the view that the guaranties include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture. This prohibition has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) ((Dec. 10, 1948) which states, in the plainest of terms, “no one shall be subjected to torture.” 10 The General Assembly has declared that the Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration “constitute basic principles of international law.” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) {25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121} (Oct. 24, 1970).

4. It is then clear that Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/unrights.htm#art8) is a matter of recognized Right of the Petitioner:
“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by constitution or by law.”

5. Since Remedy exists, then no Court of any State has any Right to treat the Citizen with contempt by violating the Rights that the remedy is to repair, just as set forth in the 14th Amendment, and forcing the individual to vindicate his clearly applicable Rights.
J. Denial of Due Process of Law by the Courts, its exclusive duty to a Civilized Society, causes mental anguish and harms the Rights and quality of Life of those Denied Remedy.
1. Mr. Bell asserts that the acts of the Courts violating his Rights has caused him sever mental pain, suffering, and anguish, by its complicity and fomentation of the destruction of his liberties, family life, home, self-esteem, and reputation, by the government’s attempt to intimidate him from maintaining his Rights and Freedoms, even within the State of Tennessee, are similar and relative to the experience he has received from the related actions of the government of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and fall within the definition of “Torture” under International Law.
“Particularly relevant is the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, General Assembly Resolution 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N.Doc. A/1034 (1975), which is set out in full in the margin. 11 The
Declaration expressly prohibits any state from permitting the dastardly and totally inhuman act of torture. Torture, in turn, is defined as “any act by which severe pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such purposes as … intimidating him or other persons.” The Declaration goes on to provide that “(w)here it is proved that an act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment has been committed by or at the instigation of a public official, the victim shall be afforded redress and compensation, in accordance with national law.” This Declaration, like the Declaration of Human Rights before it, was adopted without dissent by the General Assembly. Nayar, “Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy,” 19 Harv. Int’l L.J. 813, 816 n.18 (1978).

“These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, “(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to promote.” Sohn, “A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in The United Nations and Human Rights, 18th Report of the Commission (Commission to Study the Organization of Peace ed. 1968). Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated.” 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/1/610 (1962) (memorandum of Office of Legal Affairs, U.N. Secretariat). Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding pronouncement,’ but is rather an authoritative statement of the international community.” E. Schwelb, Human Rights and the International Community 70 (1964). Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and “insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States.” 34 U.N. ESCOR, supra. Indeed, several commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary international law. Nayar, supra, at 816-17; Waldlock, “Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of the European Convention,” Int’l & Comp. L.Q., Supp. Publ. No. 11 at 15 (1965).”
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra, at 882-83

“Having examined the sources from which customary international law is derived the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists 16 we conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and citizens. Accordingly, we must conclude that the dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck, supra, 534 F.2d at 31, to the effect that “violations of international law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state,” is clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of international law. The treaties and accords cited above, as well as the express foreign policy of our own government, 17 all make it clear that international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments.”
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, supra, at 884-85

2. The Rights Mr. Bell has been intimidated from exercising and effectively chilled, by the denial of due process of law by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Northampton and York Counties Domestic Relations Section ignoring existing evidence of a Federal Court Order separating of him from his prior ability to earn prior levels of remuneration, constructively denied and/or chilled his right to the society and companionship of his children:
“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 -401 (1923). “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). And it is now firmly established that “freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974).”
Quillon v. Walcott , 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)

Mr. Bell’s Parental Rights are well addressed and supported in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
3. Concurrently, Mr. Bell’s children have right to access to both of their parents which includes him as well, per international law, at page 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Assembly resolution 44/25 as of November 1989, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf (Exhibit Q).
4. Rights are that which is natural in existence, as natural as respiration of air, equal in immediacy and individual volition.
Rights are the innate manifestation of the heart, soul, and mentality of the individual. They cease to be when subjected to regulation, hindrance, intimidation, and subjugation to quid pro quo abrogation of one right for the securing of another. Separation of Rights, like the right to access to one’s own children, is a cause of great mental pain and suffering.
The Attached Exhibit R, a much cited study revealing Divorced Men twice as likely to commit suicide than other Men, and almost 4 times more likely than divorced or married Women.
Pain and suffering by separation from loved ones, that Right to their presence and comfort, is revealed by the facts of this study.
5. This Court in this present action is now seeking to join the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the continued abuse of Mr. Bell’s due process rights, by threatening incarceration for him refusing to surrender his Due Process Rights by appearing before a court that has by its own laws and precedent not obtained jurisdiction, and threatening action to take the few remaining possessions from him, further reducing his mental outlook, belief in the value of his life, belief in truth, belief in justice, and hope to again one day be with his children.
6. Where there is Right there must be Remedy. Mr. Bell’s Rights are well established from the Magna Carta June 12, 1215, to present international law.
For that sole reasons, as stated in Hazel-Atlas, supra at p. 246, it is the duty of the Court to not be mute as it applies the law, but to provide meaningful due process of law as the tool to achieve the Fruit of the Judicial Process; JUSTICE to the Rights of Man; for the preservation of the Rights of Man that the government was created to serve.
Action to the contrary is despotism. Despotism to a Man raised to believe he was free, possessed Rights, was entitled to Justice, is torturous mental anguish.

CONCLUSION

Despite the documents received by Mr. Bell, this Court of Knox County and the State have never before had in personum jurisdiction over Mr. Bell to demand anything from him before or on August 16, 2007.
The existence and service of these documents to Mr. Bell outside of the Jurisdiction of the State of Tennessee and the Office of the Sheriff of Knox County evidenced that this Court and the TN DHS CSS is still not interested in providing meaningful due process of law under the UISFA to Mr. Bell.
Mr. Bell is of no delusion to think that the present record of the matter and the most recent documents indicate that the State intends to make proper notification of process per the UISFA T.C.A. §§36-5-2601 through 36-5-2607 as required by the statute per the Courts in Jolly (supra), and does actually intend to substantively deny him meaningful due process of law by:
A.) acting outside of its limitations of Jurisdiction
B.) Refusing to make proper service and notification of Rights and disclosure of the his Due Process of law under the UISFA; and;
C.) is presently threatening him with arrest and incarceration in a facility that is publicly notorious for inmate rape.
Mr. Bell is of the clear understanding and experience of the raw power and force of the Courts to act contrary to their duties and obligations to a Free Society of Rights and Rule of Law.
Mr. Bell is well acquainted with that terror.

Remedy

Mr. Bell seeks for proper, polite, substantive, and evidenced notification that this Court recognizes it is in error and has closed this matter.
Failure of this Court and the Knox County Sheriff’s Office to drop this matter by 10 A.M. on July 16, will be deemed a confirmation that the County of Knox and the State of Tennessee is continuing to deny Mr. Bell his rightful and meaningful due process of law, as set forth under state statute, intends to intimidate him to waive due process by threat of incarceration, and thus Habeas Corpus must then be pursued.

Respectfully Submitted,

__________________________
Thurston Paul Bell
121 Manor Way
Apartment H
Louisville, TN 37777
865 964 9543

Subscribed and sworn before me, a Notary Public, of the State of Tennessee, acting in the County of Blount, this _______ day of July, 2007, that the above named person did appear before me and was identified to be the person executing this document.

_____________________________
Notary Public

My commission expires on: __________________________________