SADC Africa – Beware the Big-Man syndrome

Beware the Big-Man syndrome

By Duncan du Bois

As Africa’s history shows, Big Man-type rule invariably accedes to power under such conditions, writes DUNCAN DU BOIS

The solidarity shown by SADC leaders with the tyrant Robert Mugabe at the recent SADC summit in Lusaka not only affirmed the stricken historical path Africa continues to tread, but also signalled that South Africa is positioned to experience the same fate.

Fifty years have passed since Ghana’s independence in 1957 precipitated the independence of the rest of the continent. Starting with Ghana, a pattern of socio-economic decline has occurred that has been repeated in every African state except Botswana.

Historian Paul Johnson credits the professional politician with this ruin. From the outset the professional politician’s view of the prospect of independence was quite different from that of the masses. They looked forward to justice and upliftment, while he saw the new political dispensation as a platform for personal enrichment. In the years since 1960, the professional politician has had a field day. Independence has come to mean the right to elect (and re-elect) politicians whose promises have impoverished the masses.

Inherent in this situation are what Johnson calls “two fatal fallacies”. The first is that all economic problems can be solved by political means.

“What politics [such as colonialism] had done, politics could undo.” Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana embraced this wholeheartedly. “African unity is above all a political kingdom which can be gained only by political means,” he stated in May 1963 (Modern Times). The second fallacy is what Johnson terms the charismatic personality also called the Big Man. By propagating the view that his role in the creation of Ghana had been so prodigious, Nkrumah encouraged his supporters to call him “the Redeemer”. By 1961, the Redeemer had exalted himself to the point where his utterances became holy writ.

“No African,” he said, “can have an opinion that differs from mine.” From him, other African leaders took their cue. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was called “Teacher”, Hastings Banda of Malawi was known as “Conqueror” or “Saviour”. Idi Amin of Uganda was called “Big Daddy”, while Joseph Mobutu of Congo preferred the ideology of “Mobutuism” to cultism.

The combination of the politicised economy and the entrenched, professional politician ring-fenced by an elite of praise singers ensured that Ghana’s economy and constitutionality nose-dived. In 1966, the Redeemer was toppled by a military coup. It was the only way to end his despotism since he had removed all constitutional means of doing so.

Sadly, the object lessons of Ghana’s demise have been studiously ignored by the rest of the continent. That same pattern of ruin and dissolution has been repeated again and again. Yet Ghana’s experience under Nkrumah continues to highlight the reasons upliftment eludes Africa. Of course, nowadays, the rhetoric has changed. For the benefit of foreign donors and investors the new political aristocracy routinely extols the virtues of democracy and the rule of law. But as the Lusaka summit showed, the current political elite is as flawed as that of Nkrumah’s generation.

Instead of breaking with Mugabe because of his despotic destruction of Zimbabwe, SADC leaders, shamefully led by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, embraced him. By that single act they demonstrated that they pay lip service to democracy and human rights, that they prioritise the survival of their political caste system above the desperate plight of millions of their fellow Africans who Mugabe has turned into refugees and that, as a group, they are as detached from their fellow Africans as Nkrumah and the earlier elites were.

Despite the faults of South Africa’s past — the elite political caste system developed by the National Party and the inequalities of apartheid — improvements in service delivery were realised, hospitals were staffed and functioned, the gap between rich and poor was less, standards were maintained and skills were nurtured. The same cannot be said of South Africa after 13 years of African National Congress rule.

The economy is increasingly politicised, the electorate is progressively disillusioned with service delivery and its costs, while the political elite is ring-fenced against censure. Relishing these developments are the political ambitions of a cultist, Big Man leader in the form of Jacob Zuma.

Couched in terms of employment equity and empowerment, and bolstered by socialist ideology, economic policy today is far more politicised than under apartheid. The new political czars think that a fast-tracked set of black multi-millionaires can anchor the economy as effectively as the Raymond Ackermans whose wealth generation is

the product of a lifetime of hard work and enterprise.

Despite a skills shortage, the new czars sanction policies which result in the emigration of white skills. Although food security is under dire threat, they persist with land handovers and claims, which further marginalise agricultural output and prospects.

Dysfunctional state departments awash with fraud and corruption inevitably mean poor to non-existent service delivery. Yet nobody is sacked for incompetence. In many areas of the country cronyism rules. Democracy is only about the duty to re-elect the ruling party.

As Africa’s history shows, Big Man-type rule invariably accedes to power under such conditions. As Mbeki’s tenure limps to its end, Zuma has all the right credentials for the part of Big Man ruler. Only three things stand in his way: the independence of the courts, a vigorous press and the Democratic Alliance. The weakening or loss of any one of those will cripple the others. Quo vadis, South Africa?

• Published with permission from the writer. Duncan Du Bois is a Durban Metro Democratic Alliance ward councillor. He writes in his private capacity.